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In 2014, Russia carried out a sudden military intervention in its neighboring country and former Soviet Union member state, Ukraine. Masked Russian Army soldiers and militia occupied Ukraine’s southern portion, the Crimean Peninsula, followed by a full-scale battle in the southeastern Donbass region. These problems remain unresolved even today.
 
As a researcher of Russian national security policy, this was a shock for me. While this was not the first time Russia had carried out a military intervention in a former Soviet member state, it had never annexed another country’s territory (note that Crimea is a large peninsula, roughly 70% the size of Japan’s Kyushu island), which was the first reason for my shock.
 
The second reason was that on this occasion, the European Union and United States announced strict economic sanctions against Russia for its intervention in Ukraine. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) clarified its stance to resist Russia’s military menace. In other words, military tension had once again reared its head in Europe, which had hitherto been relatively peaceful after the end of the Cold War.
 
My “main job” has been to keep a close watch on such a situation, especially its military aspects, and gauge Russia and NATO’s intentions. Yet, at the back of my mind, I have always felt that that was not enough. In other words, I believe that what I really needed to do was sufficiently consider developments in Russian security policies and strategies, because without that knowledge, I would not be able to find answers to broader questions: Why did Russia make such a dramatic move into Ukraine? What are Russia’s intentions regarding its relations with Europe and the United States, relations that have decisively soured?
 
This book, “Russia as an Empire” (the Geopolitics of Russia as an Empire), turns its focus to Russia’s own internal logic regarding the space that comprised the former Soviet Union. Even after its breakup, Russia has seen the former Soviet member states as being within its “sphere of influence,” and it seeks to control as well as determine what occurs in these countries, despite it being impossible for Russia to dictate everything that happens. One example is Russia’s opposition to these countries joining NATO, with Russia determined to prevent this at any cost, including employing military force if necessary. It does not even fear the consequences of these actions, including the worsening of its relationships with Europe and the United States. This is the picture of 21st-century Russia as depicted in this book. Stated differently, in Russia’s world view, it is the “major power” nations (especially in terms of military might) that have “sovereignty” in the true sense of the term—all other mid- and small-sized countries then become “protectorates” (or semi-sovereign states) whose authority is limited by these “major powers.” Of course, Russia itself is a “major power,” and thus, sees itself as having the right to limit the sovereignty of the former Soviet member states.
 
Viewed from a historical perspective, this way of thinking has not been uncommon. The problem is that Russia has actually acted on the basis of such thought, and the international society has been unable to prevent or put a stop to such actions. It can be said that Russia’s actions have shaken and destabilized the international order of the latter half of the 20th century and thereafter. How will the world be in the future? It is hoped that this book serves as one reference for that.

 

(Written by KOIZUMI Yu, Project Assistant Professor, Research Center for Advanced Science and Technology / 2020)