How States Systems Emerge
Details
| Type | Lecture |
|---|---|
| Intended for | General public / Enrolled students / Applying students / International students / Alumni / Companies / High school students / University students / Academic and Administrative Staff |
| Date(s) | December 10, 2024 10:00 — 11:30 |
| Location | Hongo Area Campus |
| Venue | Conference Room, Ito International Research Center 3F, the University of Tokyo MAP |
| Capacity | 40 people |
| Entrance Fee | No charge |
| Registration Method | Advance registration required
Please be sure to sign up from the registration form below. |
| Registration Period | December 1, 2024 — December 9, 2024 |
| Contact | Security Studies Unit (SSU), Institute for Future Initiatives (IFI) ssu★ifi.u-tokyo.ac.jp (★→@) |
[Overview]
The article begins with suggesting a tripartite taxation for the study of comparative states systems, with type one systems emerging out of culturally similar units, type two systems emerging as culturally similar units of one or more type change and standardize their unit type, and type three systems emerging as culturally different systems evolve a set of practices in lieu of a common culture. Noting a tradition in IR for denying the possibility of type three systems to emerge, part two tests and falsifies this hypothesis against the emergence of the Amarna system (ca. 1700 – 2000 BCE). Culturally distinct Babylonia, the Hittite Empire and Egypt formed a fully-fledged system. The emergence of a common culture and the emergence of a system need not be sequential but can also be co-constitutive. Given that religious tolerance and warfare were both integral to system emergence, the article concludes that, while the case supports Reus-Smit’s adage that large-scale arrangements of political authority emerge in contested settings, conflictual and cooperative interaction patterns may both firm systems. At no point were the wars that frequently broke out caused by cultural difference. Cultural distinctness may be generally overrated as a source of conflict in systems.
The article begins with suggesting a tripartite taxation for the study of comparative states systems, with type one systems emerging out of culturally similar units, type two systems emerging as culturally similar units of one or more type change and standardize their unit type, and type three systems emerging as culturally different systems evolve a set of practices in lieu of a common culture. Noting a tradition in IR for denying the possibility of type three systems to emerge, part two tests and falsifies this hypothesis against the emergence of the Amarna system (ca. 1700 – 2000 BCE). Culturally distinct Babylonia, the Hittite Empire and Egypt formed a fully-fledged system. The emergence of a common culture and the emergence of a system need not be sequential but can also be co-constitutive. Given that religious tolerance and warfare were both integral to system emergence, the article concludes that, while the case supports Reus-Smit’s adage that large-scale arrangements of political authority emerge in contested settings, conflictual and cooperative interaction patterns may both firm systems. At no point were the wars that frequently broke out caused by cultural difference. Cultural distinctness may be generally overrated as a source of conflict in systems.
